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TRANSPORT POLICY, ACCEPTANCE AND THE MEDIA 
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Abstract  :  The  last  two  decades  have  seen  a  substantial  change  in  the  basic  philosophy 
underlying  European  transportation  policy.  Due  to  the  Commission’s  efforts  and  due  to 
supporting  jurisdiction  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice  the  dominant  approach  to 
transportation  policy  has  become  far  more  market  oriented.  This  change  of  approach  in 
transportation policy will only be successful and sustainable if the problem of acceptability 
will  be  solved.  For  researchers  this  entails  that  their  perspective  must  change  from  the 
normative to the positive aspects of transportation policy-making. This paper reports work 
undertaken within research project TIPP (Transportation Institutions in the Policy Process) 
funded  by  the  European  Commission.  In  this  work  it  has  been  attempted  to  develop  a 
theoretical structure that merges the positive economic theory of regulation with cognitive 
psychology and traffic psychology. This theoretical structure offers a matrix of actors and 
factors that are seen to be essential for success or failure in the implementation of a certain 
measure  of  transport  policy.  Four  case  studies  were  carried  out  in  order  to  check  the 
plausibility  of  this  approach.  The  case  studies  are  the  failure  of  the  German  Railway 
(Deutsche Bahn AG) to introduce a new tariff system in passenger transport in the period 
2002-2003, the attempt to introduce a toll for HGVs in Germany, the failure to operate a 
private tolled motorway in Hungary (M1/M15), the failure to introduce a road-pricing system 
in the densely populated Randstad area in the Netherlands.  
 
Keywords: Transportation Policy, Europe, Common Transport Policy, Transport Regulation, 
Acceptability 
 
JEL classification: L51, L9, L91, L98 
 
 
   2
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades there has been a substantial change in the dominant paradigm in 
European transportation policy-making. Due to efforts at the national and European level and 
due to supporting jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice state authorities have loosened 
their  grip  on  the  transport  system  and  markets  have  become  substantially  liberalized.  Of 
course,  many  open  questions  and  many  controversial  issues  remain  (as  in  every  area  of 
economic policy) but basically it is clear to all actors that the transport sector in all member-
countries will be far more market driven in the future than in the past. This also holds true for 
the accession countries, notwithstanding the fact that in certain sub-markets (e.g. railways) 
they still may have a long way to go to reach the degree of liberalization of the former EU-15 
area.  
 
If this change of political paradigm in transportation policy is to be successful and sustainable 
the responsible authorities in the various member-countries and on the European level must 
follow the right strategies in implementing the new approach. The aim of the authorities must 
be to guarantee that transport markets function properly. Where due to inherent problems of 
market failure this is not possible they must find a feasible and politically acceptable way to 
correct the market failure.  
 
It is hardly to be expected that this aim can be achieved without major political conflicts of 
interest.  Furthermore,  the  institutional  framework  in  certain  countries  may  impose  tight 
boundaries on what is feasible. For a successful implementation of the European Common 
Transportation  Policy  it  is  therefore  of  supreme  importance  to  specify  in  advance  where 
possible  conflicts  of  interest  may  arise  and  where  institutional  barriers  to  implementation 
exist.  Experience  shows  that  in  transportation  policy  there  is  rarely  the  possibility  of  “a 
second chance”. This seems especially true with respect to the liberalization of markets. If an 
attempt at liberalization fails there is usually a return to state intervention, not another attempt 
to liberalize. 
 
These remarks have implications for the research agenda in transportation economics and 
policy. In terms of economic theory one might say that research concerning transport policy 
has to move from the perspective of normative theory to the perspective of positive theory. 
Normative theory deals with the question what should be done, positive theory deals with the   3
question what can be done or what will be done. Normative theory takes on the attitude of the 
university professor in front of his blackboard who is able to set all parameters in an optimal 
fashion  to  maximize  welfare  regardless  of  political  conflicts  of  interest  and  institutional 
constraints. Positive theory, in contrast, realizes that there are a lot of imperfections in the real 
world which real policy-making has to take into account. First, politicians in general are not 
benevolent  welfare-maximizers.  Usually  they  follow  their  own  interests  although  they  are 
restrained  somewhat  in  doing  this  by  competition  from  other  politicians.  Second,  not  all 
policy measures are equally acceptable to the affected citizens or the public in general. There 
may  be  cognitive  limitations  to  understand  the  economic  meaning  or  the  effectiveness  of 
policy  measures.  Or  there  may  be  resistance  to  a  certain  policy  measure  because  its 
distributional consequences are judged to be “unfair”. Third, institutional factors may prevent 
a policy measure to be implemented from one day to the other. For instance, the reform of 
railway policy in Germany in the 80s required a change in the German constitution. Changes 
like this take time and usually meet with substantial opposition. 
 
The  EU  funded  research-project  TIPP  in  which  the  authors  of  this  paper  took  part,  was 
explicitly devoted to studying implementation problems of the European Common Transport 
Policy. The approach was to be theoretical as well as empirical. On the one hand theories 
were  to  be  identified  that  could  help  to  guide  the  implementation  process  in  the  various 
member  countries  of  the  EU.  On  the  other  hand  a  large  set  of  case-studies  were  to  be 
performed in order to get a feeling for the applicability of the various theories. Among the 
theories  that  were  considered  to  be  suitable  for  this  purpose  were  the  New  Institutional 
Economics, the Positive Theory of Regulation, Game Theory, Public Choice, the Economic 
Theory  of  Federalism  and  the  modern  Theory  of  Cognitive  Psychology  and  Traffic 
Psychology.  
 
The present paper focuses on the results of one part of the project in which an attempt was 
made to bring two types of very different theories together: the Positive Theory of Economic 
Regulation and Cognitive Psychology and Traffic Psychology. Based on previous modelling 
work (see e.g. Schlag/Teubel (1997), Schade/Schlag (2000) and Wieland (2003)) a team of 
psychologists and economists at Dresden Technical University attempted in this part of the 
project (WP4) to merge these two perspectives into a coherent whole to get a new view of the 
political acceptability of transportation policy measures. The reason why this was thought 
necessary will be explained in the next section of this paper. The result of this effort was a   4
“psycho-economical model” or rather a matrix that tries to identify key factors which are 
crucial for success or failure of transportation policy measures. It goes without saying that this 
output  of  the  joint  research  effort  is  still  of  a  preliminary  and  in  some  aspects  very 
unsatisfactory character. Based on this matrix four case studies were performed in the hope 
that these case studies would throw some light on the question whether the criteria that we 
had  identified  were  indeed  of  relevance  for  the  failure  or  success  in  the  implementation 
process of transportation policy measures.  
 
The case studies which were selected were very few in number and highly selective. Their 
purpose  is  rather  to  show  the  “psycho-economic”  approach  at  work  than to draw general 
conclusions. Still we believe that several interesting hypotheses about the factors leading to 
failure or success in implementing transportation policies emerge.  
The case studies are the following: 
 
·  The failure of the German Railway (Deutsche Bahn AG) to introduce a new tariff 
system  in  passenger  transport  in  the  period  2002-2003.  (This  case  study  was 
performed by TU Dresden.) 
 
·  The attempt to introduce a toll for HGVs in Germany. (This case study, again, was 
carried out by TU Dresden) 
 
·  The failure to operate a private tolled motorway in Hungary (M1/M15). (This case 
study was conducted by Budapest University of Technology.) 
 
·  The failure to introduce a road-pricing system in the densely populated Randstad area 
in  the  Netherlands.  (This  case  study  was  performed  by  Free  University  of 
Amsterdam.) 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section we briefly describe 
the psycho-economical model that formed the basis for the case-study work in this part of the 
project. The following section will sketch the results of the four case studies just mentioned 
and try to draw some lessons which are common to the case-studies. The last section offers 
conclusions.    5
2. The analytical framework  
 
It was pointed out above that positive economic theory is not so much concerned with the 
question which types of policies are desirable from a normative point of view. Rather than 
asking which policy would be most desirable from the standpoint of normative economics 
positive theory is interested in predicting the likely course of action that will be taken in a 
given society with respect to a certain problem of economic policy. In order to be successful 
at this endeavour positive theory has to admit “real-world frictions” into its modelling, like 
self-interested  politicians  and  the  influence  of  a  society’s  traditions  and  institutions.  In 
principle there is nothing new in this idea. It has long been recognized in economic theory that 
self-interested politicians and the institutional framework of a society have to be taken into 
account in realistic economic theorizing. The Economic Theory of Interest Groups and the 
Positive  Theory  of  Economic  Regulation  gives  ample  evidence  that  economic  theory  has 
responded to this challenge.  
 
The spirit of this type of work is well captured in the well known Stigler/Peltzman model 
(Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976, 1993; see also the reformulation by Mesher/Zajac, undated) of 
the Positive Theory of Economic Regulation which the work in this part of TIPP has used as a 
starting  point  on  which  our  own  modelling  efforts  were  built.  The  essence  of  the 
Stigler/Peltzman approach is to model a politician as an individual who is mainly interested in 
staying in office. Two factors influence his chances of becoming re-elected: the effect of his 
actions on economic welfare and the support of interest groups. Giving favours to a certain 
interest group may induce political and monetary support from this interest group. It comes at 
the  cost,  however,  of  diminishing  welfare  which  may  reduce  the  number  of  votes  the 
politician will get from the general population. To give an example: Imposing restrictions on 
market access for the provision of a certain transportation service normally results in benefits 
for the producers of this service. On the other hand, the ensuing reduction in competition will 
harm the consumers of this service. The producers are quite likely to “buy” the reduction in 
competition  from  the  politician  by  promising  to  support  his  next  election  campaign.  The 
consumers, and the public at large, however, may frown upon the politician’s decision and 
withdraw votes from him at this very election.  
 
We may turn this example around in order to explain a politician’s motivation to deregulate. 
In the case of US airlines it seems to have been the case that politicians and the public alike   6
had become aware that the consumers of airline services (a very large part of the population in 
the US) would benefit from deregulation. The success of the low-cost carrier Southwest in 
Texas where federal aviation regulation did not apply made this plainly visible to everyone. It 
was clear, on the other hand, that the incumbent airlines would be harmed by deregulation. 
Apparently for US politicians the voting power of airline consumers counted more than the 
withdrawal of political support of the airline industry. 
 
The  Stigler/Peltzman  model  shows,  however,  that  in  most  cases  the  politician  will  avoid 
extreme positions like total deregulation or total regulation but rather will “strike a balance” 
between  catering  to  interest  groups  and  harming  the  population.  Other  models  of  the 
economic  Theory  of  Interest  Groups  have  carried  the  modelling  of  the  effects  of  interest 
groups  much  further  (especially  with  respect  to  the  strategic  use  of  information)  but  in 
essence the approach is the same.  
 
This view of the world is certainly interesting and possesses much explanatory power. At the 
same time, however, it is clear that it is too simple. First, it is obvious in the Stigler/Peltzman 
model that consumers or citizens must be able to understand that they are being harmed or 
benefited  by  a  certain  act  of  transportation  policy.  Railway  tariffs  may  serve  as  a  good 
example. It is not clear to most travellers why peak-load pricing is a good policy to allocate 
scarce  railway  capacity  in  rolling-stock  and  to  provide  the  right  economic  incentives  for 
investment. Instead, most customers tend to believe that the best policy to solve the crowding 
of  trains  would  be  to  add  additional  passenger  cars  to  the  existing  trains  or  to  increase 
frequency.  Psychologically  speaking,  there  are  cognitive  limitations  to  understanding  the 
effects of transportation policies. For some types of policies these limitations may be stricter 
than for others but that they exist can hardly be denied. In addition psychology tells us that 
there may be systematic biases in citizens’ perceptions of policies.  
 
It  is  often  argued  in  the  literature  that  competition  among  politicians  will  mitigate  these 
cognitive problems. It is in the interest of the politicians, so the argument goes, to educate the 
public and also to expose flaws in the opposite candidates’ arguments. Likewise the press has 
an interest to supply information that corrects misperceptions on the part of the citizen.  
 
There is some merit in this argument but it is well known from the literature on public choice 
that in many cases the average voter prefers to stay “rationally ignorant”. The opportunity cost   7
of time may simply to be too high to become an expert in every question of economic policy 
or to listen to debates between political candidates. As far as the media are concerned it is 
clear that in a privately financed system only those topics will be picked up which “sell”. In 
most  cases  these  are  not  topics  of  transportation  policy  although  there  are  some  notable 
exceptions which we shall describe in the case studies. 
 
Therefore  we  believe  that  it  safe  to  state  that  in  many  cases  neither  competition  among 
political candidates nor the media will have much effect in correcting the citizens’ knowledge 
about the welfare losses a certain transport policy will impose in them (or is already currently 
imposing on them).  
 
Considerations like this have lead our research in this part of TIPP to depart from the main-
stream literature in economic policy and to adopt an approach that tries to merge psychology 
and economic theory. There are more arguments, however, than the one just mentioned that 
speak for such a merger: 
 
In  models  of  the  Stigler/Peltzman  type  it  is  possible  in  principle  that  consumers  may  be 
exploited by the producers if they are able to persuade politicians or regulators to impose a 
corresponding regulation. All that counts is how much pressure the producers as an interest 
group can exert on the politician and how much counter-pressure the citizens can exert by the 
(implicit) threat to withdraw votes from the politician. In reality things are not as simple as 
that.  It  can  be  observed  that  in  most  cases  the  interest  groups  will  attempt  to  base  their 
position on normative arguments. In matters of economic policy they will seek to show by 
arguments taken from normative economic theory that their position has a legitimisation in 
economic  theory.  In  other  cases  interest  groups  may  appeal  to  theories  of  justice,  to  the 
concept of fairness, to ethics, or to social norms or traditions. It is important here to notice 
that  normative  theory  so  to  speak  enters  positive  theory  again  through  the  backdoor.  No 
interest group would probably have any chance to achieve its goals that would consciously 
refrain from any normative argumentation for its position. We adopt the view therefore that it 
is of high importance to take the concept of legitimacy into account. Not every demand of an 
interest group is considered to be “legitimate” by the voting population. The population must 
be convinced that the demand is somehow “justified” by normative arguments. In particular, it 
is important that an intended political act is not considered to be “unfair”. The notion of 
“acceptability” which is well established in research on transportation policy is closely related   8
to the concept of legitimacy. Only policies that are considered to be legitimate are politically 
acceptable. 
 
Considerations like this have lead the research in WP4 to borrow from the rapidly growing 
field of Fairness Theory (see Konow 2003, Zajac 1985), where economists (empirical game 
theorists),  psychologists  and  social  scientists  work  closely  together.  Again  we  found 
confirmation for our view that psychological theories have to be incorporated into the existing 
models of positive economics.  
 
Apart from the scientific aspects of this question it is obvious that incorporating psychological 
aspects into the traditional economic modelling has tremendous practical consequences for 
policy advice particularly with respect to the implementation of policy measures. The main 
conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing remarks is, that in order to implement a 
certain policy measure successfully it is not enough that its normative content is convincing. It 
is equally important that the policy measure is acceptable to politicians and the public at large. 
Whether a certain policy measure fulfils this precondition or not must be analysed ex ante, 
that is before the attempt of implementation is made. As was pointed out above liberalization 
measures  usually  can  only  be  tried  out  once.  If  they  misfire  there  is  usually  a  return  to 
interventionist policy. This is particularly relevant for the European Commission’s Common 
Transport Policy which contains many measures to liberalize transport markets. In so far it is 
of high importance to understand the likely reaction of the public before the actual attempt at 
implementation is being made. In some cases it may suffice that the policy-measure is simply 
reframed.  In  other  cases,  however,  it  may  be  unavoidable  to  change the substance of the 
measure in the direction of a compromise that is more palatable to the public. It is at this point 
where normative economic theory comes in again to judge whether the compromise is then 
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In order to become more concrete we developed the following analysis matrix which has also 
served as the basic organizing scheme for the case studies:  
 
Table 1: Analysis Matrix 
 
 
In line with the above discussion and the economic Theory of Interest Groups we have first 
turned our attention to identifying the relevant actors and interest groups. In the first row of 
the matrix we have listed the actors and interest groups which we consider to be of particular 
relevance.  
These are:   
 
·  The transport providers and their interest groups  
-  In this category we subsumize transport firms, like railways, airlines, private 
infrastructure providers, but also lobbying groups like automobile clubs, user 
groups and the like. 
   10
·  Politicians/regulators  
-  Here  we  understand  both  terms  in  a  very  wide  sense  incorporating  all 
individuals  wielding  political  influence  in  the  transport  sector.  We  do  not 
distinguish according to federal level etc. (This deficiency should be remedied 
in future work.) 
 
·  The public and its different interest groups  
-  This category comprises more than only the users of a certain transport service. 
It contains also seemingly unconcerned citizens who nevertheless may have 
their  opinion  on  a  certain  element  of  transportation  policy.  For  instance, 
opinion polls show that many people never travel by rail. Nevertheless they 
may have strong opinions on the governments railway policy.  
 
·  The media 
-  We have already pointed out above that we consider the media to have a very 
important  role  in  the  implementation  process  of  transport  policy.  The  case 
study  on  road-pricing  in  the  Netherlands  and  on  the  tariff-reform  of  the 
German Railway bear this out. However, as was already mentioned, it is only 
certain issues that are picked up in the media.  
 
A word on the influence of the media may be in order here. The primary objective of private 
mass media is to earn money. In the case of pay-TV-systems they can do this mainly via 
subscription  fees.  The  dominant  form  of  financing  TV-programmes  today,  however,  is 
financing by selling audiences to advertisers. In the case of newspapers financing is a mixture 
of  price  per  copy  and  advertising  revenues.  Advertising  financed  TV-channels  can  only 
maximize their profits by maximising their audience. This raises the question which topics it 
is most profitable for the media to address. Here, of course, a distinction has to be made 
between the “serious” newspapers and tv-channels and their “low-brow” counterparts. At the 
risk  of  some  simplification  it  may  be  said,  however,  that  the  popular  media  will  mostly 
address issues that appeal to basic instincts or to emotions (like catastrophes or violations of 
justice or fairness), issues that affect a large part of the population and issues that are not too 
complex. Monetary policy, for example, is a political issue that affects everyone but which is 
rarely covered in the popular press due to its complexity and its lack of emotional appeal. 
Likewise transportation policy is seldom a topic of great interest to the media. In some cases,   11
however, transportation issues are able to raise emotions and in these very cases the media 
can  become  very  influential  as  our  case  studies  confirm.  It  is  therefore  important  to 
incorporate the influence of the media in models of positive economic theory. For decision-
makers it is of important to take the possible reaction of the media into account already in the 
planning phase of a policy’s implementation process.  
 
In its first column the analysis matrix lists several criteria that we believe to be important for 
the success or failure of a certain transport policy measure. These are the following:  
 
·  Problem perception 
·  Goals 
·  Information provision 
·  Effectiveness 
·  Equity/Fairness 
·  Social environment 
·  Implementation process 
·  Political and institutional setting 
 
The choice of these criteria is not arbitrary. Their choice was guided by prior empirical and 
theoretical  work of the authors and others. (see e.g. Schlag/Teubel (1997), Schade/Schlag 
(2000) and Wieland (2003)). A few words of explanation must suffice here.  
 
To begin with the first criterion, empirical studies have shown that the acceptability of a 
certain  measure  of  transportation  policy  (e.g.  the  introduction  of  road-pricing)  is  among 
others dependent on how urgent the public perceives a certain transport policy problem to be. 
This remark is not intended to mean that fulfilment of this criterion alone is already sufficient 
to guarantee successful implementation of a policy measure. Together with the other criteria, 
however, it is an important precondition for success. The public will rarely reward a politician 
for  a  policy  action  that  is  considered  totally  superfluous  (although  such  actions,  notably 
investments, do happen). 
 
Likewise the individual goals that the various actors pursue are of primary importance for 
success or failure of a certain policy measure. In particular, goal conflicts and their resolution   12
play an important role. There may be goal conflicts for example among key actors or even on 
the individual level, for instance when a politician must weigh his own interests against the 
public interest or against the interests of an important lobbying group. The less goal conflicts 
there are the more likely the proposed policy measure will be a success. 
 
The  same  holds  true  for  the  way  in  which  the various actors in the transportation policy 
process obtain and process relevant information. The crucial role information processing in 
the  policy  process  was  already  emphasized  above.  Nowadays  it  is  acknowledged  that 
asymmetric information distribution exists in markets and that this can be one reason for 
market failure. Strategic action on the timing of the disclosure of information is also one 
possibility of actors to influence the policy implementation process.  
 
In psychological terms, a distinction must be made between whether a person feels well or 
badly informed or whether he actually is well or badly informed. Hence, a differentiation is 
necessary between so-called objective information and the subjective assessment of the own 
knowledge. Crucial for the individual decision is the subjective knowledge. Furthermore, the 
more positive the assessment of the subjective knowledge is, the more convinced of its own 
position a person will be. 
 
It must be said, however, that information provision is a complex criterion that it could only 
be analysed in a very rudimentary way.  
 
Other important criteria for the acceptance of transportation policy measures are the perceived 
effectiveness  of  such  measures  and  their  effects  on  equity.  As  far  as  effectiveness  is 
concerned it has been already found in other studies that the perceived effectiveness of a 
policy  is  a  major  determinant  for  its  success  or  failure.  There  may  be  a  substantial  gap 
between the objective effectiveness of a certain policy and the way the effectiveness of this 
policy is judged by the voters or even the politicians themselves. We mentioned above the 
example of railroad-pricing were users rarely perceive yield management as an effective way 
to deal with the overcrowding of trains during the peak-periods but rather tend to believe that 
adding more trains or cars would be more efficient.  
 
The criterion of equity/fairness is certainly one of the most important factors for failure or 
success. Equity is certainly not the same thing as fairness but in many cases fairness issues are   13
closely intertwined with distributional questions. Yield management, to cite this example once 
more, may hurt the daily commuters. Is it “fair” to demand high ticket-prices from people 
who “must” go to work by train? We have used work in the Theory of Fairness to make the 
issue  of  fairness  clearer  for  the  empirical  work  in  the  case-studies.  With  respect  to  the 
particular  case  of  transport  policy  findings  show  that  the  principle  of  equality  has  more 
influence in the public’s opinion than the principle of equity. For example, access restrictions 
are better accepted than road pricing. Pricing is regarded as a particularly unjust allocation 
mechanism  of  resources,  especially  when  individuals’  have  no  equivalent  alternatives  of 
transportation. In the debate about road pricing it is a particular concern of the public that it 
would lead to the exclusion of lower income classes. It has been found that package solutions 
increase acceptability considerably if the revenues are allocated to e.g. public transport in 
order to achieve equal access to mobility for all parts of the public.  
 
Fairness issues are always favourite topics by the media, the very reason being that they make 
the emotionalising of political issues possible. Reports about violation of fairness and equity 
addresses people’s emotion and therefore generate interest and thereby readership.  
 
As a further criterion in the analysis matrix we have added the criterion of social environment 
to reflect the fact that all actors in the policy process do not act in isolation but rather respond 
to  opinions  and  norms  held  in  their  social  environment.  Voters  respond  to  attitudes  and 
opinions held by their families or friends, politicians act in a way that improves their position 
in their respective parties and journalists try to gain the esteem of their colleagues. It seemed 
important to us to test in how far this criterion has in fact a discernible influence on the policy 
process.  
 
The current process of EU enlargement shows that the way in which a policy is implemented 
is another crucial factor for its acceptance. We basically distinguish between two approaches 
in  implementing  a  policy:  the  “big  bang”  and  gradualism.  Both  approaches  have  their 
advantages and disadvantages and must be judged in their respective context.  
 
The  last  criterion  “political  and  institutional  setting”  has  been  introduced  to  capture  the 
influence  of  a  nation’s  institutional  framework  on a certain policy. We employ a scheme 
developed in a study for the World Bank to analyse this influence (Levy/Spiller 1996). This   14
scheme  is  based  on  transaction  cost  theory  and  has  already  proven  very  successful  in 
analysing telecommunications policy.  
 
This completes our description and explanation of the analysis matrix. For guidance of the 
case studies the various cells of the matrix were filled with a large number of hypotheses. It is 
not possible to describe these hypotheses in this summary. Several of the hypotheses will be 
mentioned in the synthesis of the case study below. 
 
3. The Case Studies 
Four case studies have been conducted:  
1.  The German Railway’s attempt to introduce a new fare system in passenger transport in 
the period 2002-2003 
2.  The attempt to introduce a toll for HGVs in Germany (which is not completed yet). 
3.  The attempt to operate a private tolled motorway in Hungary (M1/M15).  
4.  The attempt to introduce a road pricing system in the densely populated Randstad area in 
the Netherlands 
With the (possible) exception of the second case all of these attempts have resulted in failure. 
This is precisely what makes them interesting in our context, because these failures allow to 
identify mistakes which policy makers should try to avoid.  
 
Case Study 1: New Fare System of the DB 
The main aim of this case study was to analyse the acceptability of a pricing system based on 
elasticities in the railway sector. Special attention was given to the influence of the media. To 
this end an extensive media analysis was conducted.  
 
In  September  2002  the  German  Railway  (DB)  presented  a new fare system to the public 
which was based on the principles of yield management well known from airline price setting. 
In fact, most of the responsible managers came from the airline industry. It is well known 
from economic theory that yield management is a form of price differentiation according to 
demand elasticities. In the case of a monopoly that is unregulated or uncontested by inter-
modal  competition  yield  management  amounts  to  a  form  of  monopolistic  price  setting. 
However, in the case where regulation or inter-modal competition exists or where the level of   15
profits is implicitly controlled by regulatory threat yield management approaches are welfare 
improving. It has to be stated that overall the DB is not making profits at present (although it 
is making profits in commuter traffic). Moreover, the DB is only formally privatised at the 
moment (with 100% of the shares remaining in the hands of the federal government), so that 
the  government  would  most  likely  intervene  if  DB  made  supernormal  profits.  In  fact 
governmental intervention was precisely what happened in the case of the new fare system. 
Therefore one may contend that the DB operates under a regime of regulatory threat.  
 
The reason why the new fare system was introduced were the desire to reduce the mounting 
deficit  of  the  DB  via  a  form  of  price  discrimination  and  to  come  to  grips  with  the 
overcrowding of trains during the peak hours (e.g. on Friday afternoon).  
 
The key elements of the new fare system (so called PEP) were the following:  
1.  The principle of a fixed price per kilometre was abandoned. The standard price was now 
based on a declining price curve, i.e. the price per kilometre declines with the distance 
travelled.  This  however  came  only  into  effect  in  the  case  of  distances  over  200km. 
Furthermore, the DB intended to adjust the price with regard to intra-modal competition 
from other railway companies (in the future) and inter-modal competition from low cost 
airlines.  
2.  The former BahnCard 50, a bonus card which offered a 50% discount on the standard 
price,  was  abolished  and  substituted  by  the  BahnCard  25,  which  only  offers  a  25% 
discount. 
3.  Passengers  could  obtain  further  discounts  if  they  booked  in  advance  and  specified  a 
particular train. The discount depended on the time remaining until the journey began:  
-  up to 7 days in advance: 40% 
-  up to 3 days in advance: 25% 
-  up to 1 day in advance: 10% 
For each segment (40%, 25% or 10% discount) only a certain amount of tickets was 
available for each train, i.e. it was possible that even when there were more than 7 days 
before the planned trip the segment with the 40% discount was already sold out. Tickets 
for the standard price without any discount were always available.  
4.  A cancellation fee of € 45,- was payable if someone wanted to use a different train than 
the one specified in the advance booking. This cancellation fee was also applicable when   16
someone missed his train and wanted to take the next one. In addition to this, he or she 
was also obliged to pay the difference between the price of the discounted ticket and the 
full standard price. 
 
The main element of the case study consists of a detailed analysis of over 400 newspaper 
articles from 5 major newspapers (four of them “serious” newspapers, one of them a tabloid, 
comparable to the “Sun” in the UK). The intention behind carrying out this media analysis 
was to show whether it is really true that the media have an influence on the success or failure 
in the implementation of a certain element of transportation policy. In the case of the new fare 
system of the DB the new system met with substantial opposition from the public and the 
media.  Revenues  in  long-distance  travel  dropped  by  7%.  All  of  this  happened  in  an 
environment where the DB was plagued by other problems as well, in particular rising delays 
and cancellations due to the largest change in the general time table for 10 years, bad weather 
conditions, the abolishment of the regional trains “Interregio”, the abolishment of dining-cars, 
etc. In the end the government felt obliged to intervene (even though it had been declared at 
the time of privatisation that the purpose of the formal privatisation was to give the DB more 
entrepreneurial freedom). After several dismissals of responsible managers main elements of 
the new fare system were revoked, in particular the cancellation fee and the reduction of the 
discount in the BahnCard from 50% to 25%.  
 
The case study shows a clear correlation between negative press reporting on the new fare 
system  and  political  action.  Nevertheless,  by  itself,  the  analysis  allows  no  clear  cut 
conclusions concerning the influence of the media. It is not clear, in particular, whether the 
media  have  been  leading  events  or  following them. A discussion of the authors with top 
management of the DB revealed, however, that it was indeed the case that the negative press 
reporting was causal for the revision of the fare system.  
 
With  respect  to  the  criteria  listed  in  the  analysis  matrix  the  case  study  showed  that  the 
following issues were crucial for the fate of the new fare system: 
1.  The new fare system PEP was so complex that most people did not take the effort to 
understand it. The opportunity costs of time to comprehend the different discount levels in 
combination with their many conditions were considered not worth the benefit.  
2.  The  problems  of  the  old  fare  system  (before  PEP)  were  not  evident  enough  for most 
passengers of the DB (no problem perception as basis of acceptability). Most passengers   17
thought  that  overcrowding  could  simply  be  solved  by  increasing  capacity  instead  of 
rationing it via prices. In addition, most passengers perceived other unsolved problems, 
like delays, as more urgent. The DB did not communicate sufficiently their motivations 
and aims of launching such a complete different fare system, compared to the old one. 
3.  The launch of the system coincided with many other negative events from a customer’s 
point  of  view.  This  caused  additional  negative  press  coverage  during  the  system’s 
introduction.  
4.  People felt treated unfairly due to certain features of the system (e.g. pricing according to 
demand elasticities and cancellation fees). The infringement of the public’s perception of 
fairness played probably an important role that the system was not accepted by the public. 
5.  Underestimation of the role of the media by the DB AG. The new fare system met all 
requirements  for  a  good  media  topic  and  offered  the  possibility  of  an  emotional 
presentation  by  the  media.  Furthermore,  the  DB  AG  pursued  a  controversial 
communication policy. 
6.  Underestimation of the power of the lobby organisations of railway passengers, like “Pro 
Bahn” and “VCD” and their very good links to the media. The passenger organisations 
realised their chance to get public attention and to increase their publicity.  
7.  The  DB  was  not  able  to  act  like  an  independent  ordinary  private  transport  company. 
Despite all privatisation plans the DB AG is still perceived by the public as a complete 
public enterprise and exposed to strong political influence by the government and the 
political opposition.  
 
Case study 2: The new HGV toll in Germany 
The  aim  of  this  case-study  was  to  show  that  pricing  policies  can  overcome  even  serious 
problems  within  the  implementation  process  by  a  strong  political  commitment  and 
acceptability of all key actors.  
 
In Germany there has been considerable discussion about a HGV toll during the last two 
decades. This discussion is embedded in the discussion about road infrastructure funding in 
general. Infrastructure as a location factor in Germany has become especially important. This 
is due to the geographic situation of Germany in the middle of Europe combined with the 
dramatic  political  changes  of  the  German  reunification  and  the  recent  enlargement  of  the 
European Union. Based on traffic forecasts which predict a substantial increase in the amount   18
of  East-West  traffic  it  is  recognised  that  there  is  an  increasing  gap  between  the  actual 
investment needs in the road infrastructure and the funds available. Moreover, the “degree of 
modernity” (the ratio between gross and net infrastructure capital stock) of the German road 
network has seriously deteriorated. Thus there are two goals of the intended toll system: (1) to 
raise funds for investment, (2) to ration road capacity, especially with respect to the rapidly 
growing transportation of goods in and through Germany. 
 
Already in 1999 the European Commission had released EC Directive 1999/62/EG which 
contained  a  statutory  framework  for  charging  heavy  good  vehicles  for  the  use  of  road 
infrastructure. In this directive certain rules are laid down defining the conditions under which 
such fees may be applied. Specifically, this directive allows for charging heavy good vehicles 
over 12 tons on motorways. The charge has to reflect the average infrastructure costs and can 
be  differentiated  according  to  the  environmental  performance  (“EURO  Standard”)  of  the 
vehicles. 
In 1999 the German federal ministry of transport set up a commission to investigate the future 
funding of transport infrastructure. The so called Pällmann-Commission presented its results 
and recommendations in September 2000. Based on the commission’s recommendations a 
cabinet bill was adopted in August 2001 to charge heavy good vehicles on motorways. The 
subsequent  Act  concerning  HGV  charges  on  motorways  (ABMG)  passed  parliament  in 
December 2001 and came into effect in April 2002. This act transformed the EC Directive 
1999/62/EG into national law. According to this law a kilometre based charge will be paid by 
all vehicles and buses with a gross permissible loading weight above 12 tons. The charge is 
limited to German motorways and will be differentiated according to emission standards and 
number  of  axles.  There  will  be  two  categories  with  respect  to  axles  and  three  emission 
categories. The average level of the charge is based on average total costs. The final version 
of the law determined an average level of the charge of 0,12 € per kilometre and went into 
effect in June 2003. 
 
The  new  system  will  replace  the  existing  time  based  “Eurovignette”  which  had  been 
introduced in 1991. (In fact, at the time of writing the “Eurovignette” has been abolished 
already even though the new HGV toll is not in place yet.) The revenues will be partly used 
for operating the toll system. The remaining revenues will be earmarked for the transport 
infrastructure,  mainly  the  federal  roads.  The  government  had  already  launched  an  “anti-  19
congestion programme” in March 2002 which contains many of the infrastructure projects 
which will be funded in this way.  
 
In parallel to the legislative process the technical implementation process started in December 
1999  with  the  call  for  tenders  for  the  new  tolling  system.  After  lengthy  proceedings  the 
German consortium Toll Collect headed by Deutsche Telekom and DaimlerCrysler AG (ETC) 
was selected to build and operate the technical system. In November 2002 the ministry of 
transport announced to abolish the current time based charging system (“Eurovignette”) by 
the 31
st of August 2003, the starting date of the new toll system. However, due to serious 
technical problems the system did not start to operate at this date and has not started yet. 
According  to  current  planning  a  two-step  implementation  approach  is  pursued  where  a 
preliminary system will work from 2005 onward and the full scheme in 2006.  
 
The HGV case study is of interest for the analytical approach taken in this part of the TIPP 
project because it shows that with a high level of acceptability among the key actors a policy 
implementation process can survive even the most serious technical problems and extremely 
negative reporting (on the technical problems and the apparent lack of resolution on the part 
of the responsible minister) by the press.  
 
In terms of our analysis matrix the following issues determined the success of the policy: 
 
·  The  gap  between  the  increasing  road  traffic  and  the  lack  of  infrastructure 
funding was (and still is) perceived as one of the most serious problems in 
Germany today by all actors. 
·  There was a strong political consensus (that is, few goal conflicts) that a HGV 
toll was warranted.  
·  The hauliers support its introduction because they feel that it will increase the 
fairness of competition with foreign truckers. They see clearly that basing the 
financing of the road infrastructure on user fees will lead to a levelling of the 
playing field because German and foreign trucks will pay the same charge. 
Under the former system foreign truckers could profit from the lower level of 
gasoline taxes in their home countries by avoiding refuelling in Germany. (The 
capacity  of  modern  HGV  tanks  makes  this  possible.)  The  “Eurovignette” 
system (taken together with the corresponding agreements on minimum levels   20
of  gasoline  taxes  and  motor  vehicle  taxes)  was  intended  to  mitigate  these 
competitive disadvantages to a certain degree but still the German truckers felt 
themselves treated in an unfair manner. Thus fairness considerations played a 
role  here  too.  (It  must  be  said,  however,  that  in  economics  fairness  of 
competition  is  rather  a  matter  of  guaranteeing  economic  efficiency  than  a 
matter of ethical judgement.)  
·  Politicians support the system for the following reasons: 
-  The revenues will raise money for infrastructure investment  
-  The toll will help to price some HGV traffic off the motorways and 
onto the railway. The first effect is popular with car drivers (who do not 
pay  any  toll  but  benefit  from  less  congestion).  The  second  effect  is 
popular  with  environmentally  concerned  voters  and  the  railway 
industry. 
 
In  this  way  almost  all  actors  profit  from  the  system.  In  terms  of  economic  theory  the 
introduction of the HGV toll is a Pareto improvement. In addition, this policy measure is 
considered to be effective and it violates nobody’s perception of fairness. Therefore even the 
embarrassing technical problems and at times sarcastic reporting in the media could not stop 
the plans to introduce the toll.  
 
Case Study 3: Private Motorways in Hungary 
The case study “Political history/acceptability of private financing in Hungary as an accession 
country”  performed  by  Budapest  Technical  University  (see  also  their  presentation  in  this 
conference) analysed the implementation process of privatisation in the case of the motorway 
M1/M15 which was the first privately financed infrastructure project in Hungary.  
 
In  the  1990s  Hungary  conducted  an  experiment  with  privately  financed  and  operated 
motorways. This experiment pertained to two short stretches on the M1/M15 and the M5. The 
M1/M15  motorways  are  part  of  the  TEN  Helsinki  Corridor  IV  and  therefore  part  of  the 
connection  between  Budapest,  Vienna  and  Bratislava.  On  the  M1/M15  the  amount  of 
kilometres covered by the experiment were less than 60 km (M1: 43 km, M15: 14km) and on 
the M5 around 160 km. The total length of the Hungarian motorway system is about 330 km.  
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The  case  study  “Political  history  /  acceptability  of  private  financing  in  Hungary  as  an 
accession country” analysed the implementation process of privatisation in the case of the 
motorway M1/M15 which was the first privately financed infrastructure project in Hungary. 
The concession to build and operate the motorway was given to a private company ELMKA 
Rt., the financing was arranged by a consortium of international banks under the leadership of 
the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  in  London.  The  role  of  the 
Hungarian state was limited to providing the necessary land, to build new feeder roads and to 
adopt  measures  for  traffic  calming  on  the  secondary  parallel  roads.  In  total  the  share  of 
Hungarian  state  in  the project amounted to one third, which still constitutes a substantial 
involvement. 
 
It was planned that interest, amortisation and operating cost of the project were to be totally 
financed  out  of  user  charges.  Charges  were  to  be  regulated  according  to  a  price-capping 
scheme  where  charges  could  be  adjusted  according  to  the  increase in the consumer price 
index without prior permission of the authorities.  
 
The tolled sections on the respective motorways were open from 1996 to 1998. Cars were 
charged 0,15 €/km. For vans, buses and HGVs this rate was multiplied according to their 
weight. However, it turned out that it was mainly foreign cars travelling long-distances which 
used the tolled section. Most traffic, especially goods traffic, switched to secondary roads. 
Given the short distances mentioned before this is, perhaps, no surprise.  
Shortly  after  the  M1  was  opened  to  the  public  several  legal  cases  were  brought  forward 
against ELMKA. The first one was a municipal procedure, the second one a civil suit started 
by the lawyer of the Hungarian Automobile Club.  
 
In the first case ELMKA was charged before the Hungarian Competition Council (HCC) with 
the accusation that it was exploiting a dominant market position and that its toll rates were too 
high.  However  the  HCC  ruled  that  according  to  the  Hungarian  Competition  Law  the 
concession  company  was  not  guilty  of  abusing  economic  power  because  their  maximum 
levels were still lower than the ones fixed in the concession contract. This decision, however, 
went into appeal before the court of first instance. The court came to the conclusion that 
according  to  the  Civil  Code  the  toll  rates  were  extremely  high  compared  to  other  public 
services (the decision was based on the parallel, civil procedure at the civil court, see below). 
Another appeal before the court of second instance followed. This time the court ruled that the   22
case had to be judged after the Capital Market Act (according to which the calculation method 
of  toll  rates  was  acceptable),  not  the  Civil  Code.  Therefore  the  concession  company  was 
acquitted. 
 
In the second case at the civil court it was ruled that according to the Civil Code the toll rates 
were unfair and extremely high, and that therefore the concession company had to pay back 
the excessive parts of the revenues to the lawyer of the Hungarian Automobile Club. 
These legal proceedings (among other reasons) resulted in a substantial revenue shortfall for 
the operating company. ELMKA finally went bankrupt and the government took over the 
responsibilities and liabilities. In 2000 the government replaced the toll system by a vignette 
system  for  the  whole  state  owned  motorway  network.  The  failure  of  this  project  lead  to 
political resistance to further privately financed infrastructure projects in Hungary.  
 
In terms of our analysis matrix the following factors determined the failure of the policy:  
·  The economic foundations were based on far too optimistic traffic forecasts. 
(This  emphasises  the  role  of  information  provision  in  the  implementation 
process.) 
·  The public felt unfairly treated because of the high toll rates, which lead to two 
court cases against the operating company. 
·  The  institutional  framework  in  Hungary  was  very  susceptible  to  what 
economists call “regulatory risk”. Regulatory risk refers to a situation where 
the private investor has already made his investments (in the form of “sunk 
costs”) and where accordingly he becomes exploitable by the government or 
the regulatory authorities. Infrastructure by its very nature is used by a large 
part of the (voting) population. As a consequence politicians have an incentive 
to exploit the investor’s weak bargaining situation by lowering user charges. 
But  they  can  do  this  only  in  an  environment  without  strong  institutional 
safeguards against such an opportunistic behaviour (e.g. a strong tradition of 
protecting property rights, or strong and independent courts, etc.). Apparently 
Hungary’s institutions at present do not offer enough of a safeguard against 
such behaviour.  
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Case Study 4: Road Pricing in the Netherlands 
This case study written by the Free University of Amsterdam (see also their own presentation 
in this conference) was again intended to show the importance of interest groups and the 
media for transport policy implementation. 
 
The  Netherlands  have  discussed  road  pricing  for  a  number  of  years.  There  are  several 
explanations for this strong interest. First, the central area in The Netherlands (the ‘Randstad 
area’ including above all Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) is among the most 
densely populated areas in the Western World. Accordingly it exhibits severe levels of traffic 
congestion.  Secondly,  the  Dutch  economy  has  traditionally  been  relatively  dependent  on 
trade, transport and logistic services. Therefore accessibility is considered as an important 
condition for further economic growth and development. Thirdly, environmental quality is 
considered by many as an important good which road pricing may help to preserve. Fourthly, 
The Netherlands seem to have a policy culture which is relatively open to novel, innovative 
and sometimes experimental policy concepts.  
 
During the last 15 years several proposals for introducing road pricing have been made in the 
Netherlands. Most recently kilometre charges are being considered. Before this latest proposal 
‘Rekeningrijden’  came  closest  to  actual  implementation,  but  was  abandoned  in  the  end. 
Rekeningrijden refers to the proposal of a system of electronic toll cordons around the cities 
of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Den Haag. Anyone driving into these cities during 7 
to 9 a.m. would have to pay a basic rate of around 3 Euro. Apart from the introduction of this 
toll charge system large sums were to be invested in public transport financed out of the 
revenues generated by Rekeningrijden. In 2000 the system became part of a larger policy 
package to deal with congestion and to keep the central economic region of the Netherlands 
accessible. Nevertheless due to substantial opposition from lobbying groups and the media the 
scheme finally was rejected.  
 
The most important cause of this failure was the “Stop Rekeningrijden” campaign that was 
started by the Dutch Automobile Association (ANWB) in early 1999 and supported strongly 
by the media, notably the popular tabloid “De Telegraaf”, which started a whole supportive 
campaign by itself. The basic arguments given by the opponents of Rekeningrijden were that 
road pricing would be ineffective (notwithstanding expert testimonies to the contrary, which 
predicted a 30% reduction in traffic) and simply result in travellers just having to pay for   24
being  stuck  in  traffic,  that  billing  would  not  function  properly,  that  the  system  would 
encourage fraud and that opinion polls were showing that the majority of Dutch citizens were 
opposed to such a system. As a result of this massive counterattack the government tried at 
first to reduce the scope of the programme by restricting it to just two cities. In the end, 
however, Rekeningrijden had to be given up.  
 
In  terms  of  our  analysis  matrix  the  most  important  criteria  to  explain  the  failure  of 
Rekeningrijden  are  information  provision  (an  insufficient  communication  policy  of  the 
government), a lack of the perceptions that the policy measure would be effective and the 
feeling that Rekeningrijden would amount mainly to a redistribution of income to the state.  
With  respect  to  communication,  the  government  in  the  Netherlands  failed  to  explain  the 
working of prices in a convincing manner. Even though the population seems to be very 
aware of the congestion problems in the Randstad area the government apparently was not 
able to explain to the public that road pricing would be an effective means of dealing with this 
problem. Many people apparently believed (and continue to believe) that road building is still 
the most effective way to cope with congestion. This is quite similar to the DB’s problem in 
Case Study 1 above to explain the workings of yield management as an instrument to ration 
capacity and to guide investment.  
 
The same holds true for the role of the media. Like in the case of the DB’s new fare system a 
small group of institutions and interest groups was able to fight Rekeningrijden successfully 
by finding the right access to the media. This once more points out the importance of thinking 
out  a  well  defined  media  policy  before  the  phase  of  implementation  of  a  certain  policy 
measure in transportation takes place.  
Like in all road pricing schemes concerns of equity have played an important role in the 
failure  of  Rekeningrijden,  though  not  a  dominant  one  according  to  the  Dutch  case  study 
researchers. Interestingly, in this case it may have been that notions of geographical equity 
were violated rather than notions of horizontal or vertical equity as is normally the case with 
respect to road pricing proposals. Horizontal equity implies that similar users should pay the 
same toll. Vertical equity demands that the distribution of costs and benefits should reflect 
people’s needs and abilities. A uniform toll of x Euro may be horizontally equitable because 
everybody pays the same amount. Nevertheless the toll may be considered to be vertically 
inequitable because it imposes a higher relative burden on the poor than the rich. With respect 
to Rekeningrijden it was clearly the case that there was discrimination between Dutch citizens   25
according  to  their  place  of  residence.  Tolling  was  only  intended  for  inhabitants  of  the 
Randstad area not for the rest of the population. This violation of geographical equity may 
have  contributed  to  the  failure  of  Rekeningrijden  but,  apparently  has  not  dominated  the 
discussion. It was not so much the redistribution among income groups that played a role but 
rather the redistribution of income to the state that would be effected by the road pricing 
scheme. 
 
Thus,  the  most  important  cause  for  the  failure  of  Rekeningrijden  was  the  feeling  of  the 
Randstad population that their personal welfare would be reduced with the introduction of 
tolling.  Many  believed  that  the  only  effect  of  Rekeningrijden  would  be  to  lower  their 
disposable income without generating any substantial effect on congestion. Thus, in terms of 
our analysis matrix it was mainly lacking perceived effectiveness and deficiencies in the way 
the scheme was communicated to the public that caused the failure of Rekeningrijden. 
 
4. Conclusion  
This  paper  has  focused  on  acceptability,  but  it  became  obvious  during  our  work  that 
acceptability is only one part of the implementation process, besides e.g. the decision-making 
structure,  technological  and  financial  issues.  Within  the  acceptability  theme,  however,  it 
emerged  from  the  theoretical  analysis  and  the  case  studies  that  the  factors  and  actors 
identified in our analysis matrix do indeed play a decisive role in the implementation process , 
largely in the way we expected from the theoretical analysis.  
 
Taking into account that our results are in line with earlier work on the acceptability issue it 
seems  that  there  is  now  at  least  some  reliable  scientific  consensus  about  the  structure  of 
acceptability.  There  is  agreement  about  the  factors  that  determine  success  or  failure  of  a 
certain policy. Likewise there is agreement about the groups of actors that play a key role in 
the  transport  policy  process.  However,  the  same  does  not  hold  true  for  the  relationships 
between  these  key  actors  and  how  these  relationships  change  over  time,  for  instance  by 
coalition  forming.  The  analysis  presented  in  this  deliverable  revealed  how  important 
interdependencies between the key actors are, but the analysis also showed that at the moment 
there is an insufficient understanding of them. This is probably not so much a deficiency with 
respect to the knowledge of facts, but rather a lack of synthesis between disciplines dealing 
with the relations between different actors. A first attempt to overcome this gap has been   26
made here by incorporating economic and psychological concepts. Further research should 
also take approaches from political sciences into account in order to examine policy processes 
(e.g. network analysis). 
 
One weakness of the categorisation of actors used here is, that it is overly coarse. It does not 
account for heterogeneity of interests within groups. For example, in the case of toll schemes 
within the group of transport providers there may be enterprises that benefit from the scheme, 
such as the operating company and thus try to influence the policy implementation positively. 
On the other hand there may be enterprises that are negatively affected by the scheme because 
of an increase in costs, such as road hauliers. They certainly will be more interested to prevent 
such  a  scheme.  Similarly  the  politicians/regulators  in  the  case  of  the  HGV  toll  acted  as 
decision-makers whereas in the case of the DB AG they only observed and reacted to it. The 
current categories (and this applies to other forms of categorisations as well) are not flexible 
enough to account for these differences. Furthermore, the case of “Rekeningrijden” shows 
that  actors  may  also  work  together  and  form  coalitions  to  achieve  their  goals.  Thus,  the 
categorisation of actors needs to be further developed to incorporate and reflect the different 
roles of groups of actors and the dynamic aspect of the interaction of key actors. 
 
It should also be noted that in achieving our results we have taken only a first step with 
respect to policy advice. We have identified the actors and factors which policy-making has to 
take into account. Insofar we are able to give some very basic recommendations (see below) 
which largely amount to a list of mistakes that should be avoided. From the viewpoint of a 
decision-maker this is certainly not very satisfactory. A decision-maker would most likely 
prefer to have a set of guidelines that tells him how to frame a certain policy-measure in order 
to make it acceptable to the public. To our knowledge the attempt to develop such a list has 
not been undertaken yet. It is clear that in order to develop such a list one would have to go 
far beyond the analysis-matrix approach in this paper. It would be necessary to develop a 
causal theory of the transport-policy process which would have to incorporate all the factors 
that we have identified in this research and probably more. This is certainly a formidable task 
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A  further  conclusion  concerning  further  research  about  policy  implementation  is,  that  it 
should regard the four areas  
·  acceptability  
·  a country’s or region’s political and legal institutions  
·  technological factors and 
·  financial issues 
as modules of the overall analysis of transport policies. The characteristics of these modules is 
that they can be differentiated for research purposes but in practice they interact and influence 
each  other  in  a  complex  way.  Within  each  module  further  research  should  aim  to  find 
appropriate  means  for  description  and  analysis.  It  should  be  considered  which  different 
research  disciplines  such  as  economics,  psychology,  sociology  or  political  science  could 
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